For many in Europe, Trump’s actions have weakened NATO’s nuclear shield.

Paris
UJ
—

A new chapter has begun for Europe.

The days of unwavering American support for Europe’s defense against Russia are behind us.

What remains – at least during Donald Trump’s presidency – is a more transactional approach, and the risks have never been greater.

“Europe needs to make significant efforts to manage its own defense,” US Vice President JD Vance emphasized to leaders in Munich last February.

Thus far, Europe’s response has involved commitments to increase funding domestically and aid for Ukraine, focusing on acquiring European-manufactured military hardware. However, a more drastic proposal has emerged: a European “nuclear shield.”

While the United States has traditionally been seen as Europe’s primary ally, France and the UK are nuclear powers in their own right, and some European officials are contemplating whether the most effective deterrence against Moscow might originate from closer quarters.

Although the majority of the world’s nuclear arsenal belongs to either the US or Russia, France possesses around 290 nuclear warheads, and the UK has 225 of the US-designed Trident missiles.

In recent weeks, European leaders have been vocal about strengthening their collective defense under a British or French nuclear umbrella, particularly as faith in Washington’s commitments appears increasingly shaky.

Earlier this month, French President Emmanuel Macron vowed to “initiate a strategic discourse on the protection via our deterrent for our allies within Europe.”

His remarks followed Germany’s anticipated next Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, expressing the need for discussions with France and the UK about expanding their nuclear protection.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk noted that the French initiative was “not a novel idea” and has resurfaced multiple times in discussions, lending his support to it.

Other leaders from traditionally nuclear-averse nations, such as Sweden and Denmark, have also shown a positive response to France’s outreach towards its European allies.

Since General Charles de Gaulle established France’s nuclear capabilities in the late 1950s, aimed at securing Paris’s influence in global affairs, the program has been distinctly sovereign, described by Macron as being entirely “French.”

However, throughout the Cold War, France sought to extend its nuclear protection to its European allies as well, as elucidated by Yannick Pincé, a historian at France’s Interdisciplinary Center for Strategic Studies (CIENS).

The UK has not publicly proposed any changes to its nuclear protection strategy. Still, its warheads are committed to the US-led NATO command, thus already providing strategic security to its European partners.

However, some leaders are still counting on bolstered US backing.

Recently, Polish President Andrzej Duda urged Trump to place US nuclear weapons in Poland, comparing it to Russia’s choice to station some of its own nuclear arms in Belarus in 2023.

“I believe the time has come, and it would enhance security if these weapons were stationed here,” Duda shared with the Financial Times.

Without a nuclear stockpile comparable to that of Russia, France can only threaten strategic retaliation, which means delivering a severe response as a deterrent, according to nuclear historian Yannick Pincé.

France’s relatively modest nuclear arsenal, when juxtaposed with that of the US, results in it being overlooked, even by the West’s leading military figures, as noted by retired General Michel Yakovleff, former deputy commander of NATO forces in Europe.

Despite its unmatched might, the size and variety of the American nuclear arsenal provide a significant edge in nuclear warfare: the ability to limit the scope of any thermonuclear conflict. The US can implement what Pincé refers to as a “measured response,” potentially opting for a single precision strike instead of deploying its entire stockpile.

In contrast, the French nuclear forces – including missile-equipped submarines and nuclear-capable bombers – were primarily designed as a last resort should Cold War Russian forces threaten France, likely targeting crucial locations within Soviet territories to compel enemy withdrawal.

These differences highlight a significant challenge for any European-centric nuclear shield.

“One significant issue is that Europeans lack a nuclear culture. They don’t fully grasp the nuances, having relied on American assurance,” remarked Yakovleff. “I believe Macron intends to educate those willing to engage in nuclear discourse.”

Macron has proposed allowing allied nations to participate in France’s confidential nuclear drills, providing insight into its capabilities and decision-making processes.

However, he has also emphasized that he will not relinquish control of his “nuclear button” to allies or even the EU. He has assured that the final decision to initiate a nuclear strike “has always remained and will always remain” under his authority, as he stated in a national address.

The UK military has been “actively engaged in enhancing what is known as the nuclear deterrence IQ within NATO,” explained Lukasz Kulesa, director of RUSI’s proliferation and nuclear policy program, ensuring that all allies understand the complexities of nuclear deterrence.

This implies that if Macron’s vision were to materialize, “France would not be stepping into an entirely uncharted territory. The countries involved have been under the umbrella of extended nuclear deterrence for decades,” stated Heather Williams, director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Importantly, however, the US has not signaled any intention to withdraw its commitment to NATO ally protection, she added.

This week, a US bomber capable of carrying nuclear weapons flew over central Stockholm to commemorate the first anniversary of Sweden’s entry into NATO – a highly meaningful gesture.

Additionally, a report published in February by the Federation of American Scientists indicated “increasing evidence from three years of collected documentation and observations” suggesting that the US is preparing to redeploy nuclear warheads to its primary airbase in the UK for the first time in more than 15 years. UJ reached out to the US Department of Defense for comments.

Such developments may reflect how seriously Washington perceives the increasing tensions in Europe.

In terms of sheer destructive capability, Europe’s nuclear arsenal pales in comparison to Moscow’s.

Enhancing Europe’s nuclear capabilities will require “years, if not decades,” of commitment and innovation, according to Kulesa from RUSI.

Yet deterrence encompasses more than just the number of missiles; it is crucial to establish the operational credibility of Europe’s nuclear forces.

Strengthening cooperation among allies regarding their nuclear capacities would significantly enhance deterrence, suggested Kulesa. This could involve offering air-to-air refueling to support French bombers or enhancing anti-submarine warfare capabilities for the safety of British and French submarines during maneuvers.

Given the decline in British military investments over previous decades, concerns have arisen about the deterrent capability of the UK’s conventional and nuclear forces, particularly due to its dependence on US supply chains.

Over the last eight years, the UK has publicly reported two failed nuclear missile tests, including an incident off the coast of Florida where dummy missiles did not launch as planned.

Last month, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer promised what the government has characterized as “the largest increase in defense spending since the Cold War” to address a world that is becoming increasingly perilous.

Furthermore, other European nations without nuclear capabilities are also ramping up their spending on conventional military assets – and this investment counts as well, according to analysts.

Ultimately, Kulesa noted, “nuclear weapons aren’t a magic solution.”

Any genuine deterrent to Russia will necessitate both conventional and nuclear forces, and with Trump’s leadership, “the concern is whether one can depend on the American commitment and engagement.”